

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4101

USIA WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE PRIORITY

AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

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STATE FOR S/PRS

DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

WHITE HOUSE FOR MR. NESSON

POSTS PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY

USINFO FOR IBS/PL AND IPS/PL

USIA FOR ILA AND IOP

RIO PASS TO NEUBERG FOR MANCHETE

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: SECVISIT LA

FOLLOWING TEXT OF SECSTATE'S BRASILIA PRESS CONFERENCE,
FEBRUARY 21, 1976.

Q. MR. SECRETARY KISSINGER, CARLOS CONDE OF ESTADO DE
SAO PAULO. MR. SECRETARY, IN SOME OF YOUR RECENT SPEECHES,
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MAINLY THE ONE IN CALIFORNIA AND THE SPEECH YOU MADE HERE

YESTERDAY AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE, YOU SAID THAT ACTIONS ALONG THE LINES OF THE CUBAN ACTION IN ANGOLA WOULD NO LONGER BE TOLERATED. AT THE SAME TIME THERE SEEMS TO BE NO INDICATION ON CAPITOL HILL AS TO ANY CHANGE REGARDING A MORE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES. HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN THAT?

A. FIRST OF ALL I WANT TO EMPHASIZE WHAT I HAVE SAID AT VARIOUS OTHER STOPS. MY TRIP TO LATIN AMERICA WAS PLANNED LONG BEFORE THE ANGOLAN ADVENTURE BY CUBA. I AM NOT HERE TO LINE UP SUPPORT FOR THE AMERICAN POSITION WITH RESPECT TO CUBA. I'M HERE TO STRENGTHEN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA, AND BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL. AND THE OTHER ISSUE IS INCIDENTAL TO IT. SECONDLY, WHEN THE ISSUE OF ANGOLA WAS DISCUSSED IN THE US CONGRESS, IT WAS DISCUSSED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE LOCAL SITUATION IN AN AFRICAN COUNTRY, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE DEBATE GOING ON IN AMERICA ABOUT HOW THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ACT IN SITUATIONS, WHETHER BY COVERT OR BY OVER MEANS. ONE REASON FOR THE REPEATED STATEMENTS BY THE PRESIDENT AND MYSELF IS TO EXPLAIN TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHAT IS INVOLVED AND TO BRING ABOUT A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF THE POTENTIAL GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS OF WHAT WE ARE DISCUSSING, AND WE BELIEVE THAT THIS UNDERSTANDING IS GROWING. AND WE BELIEVE THAT IN A DEMOCRACY AS NATIONAL LEADERS WE HAVE NO CHOICE EXCEPT TO BRING HOME OUR CONVICTIONS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. AND AS I SAID IN MY SAN FRANCISCO SPEECH, I AM CONFIDENT THAT ONCE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE UNDERSTAND WHAT IS AT ISSUE, THEY WILL ACT, AS THEY HAVE ALWAYS ACTED, WITH THE DETERMINATION THAT IS NECESSARY.

Q. NEIDE CAMPOS OF JORNAL DE BRASILIA: NOW THAT SITUATION IN ANGOLA ALREADY IS DEFINED, WHAT WOULD BE LACKING FOR THE USG TO RECOGNIZE THE MPLA AS THE GOVERNMENT OF ALL ANGOLA?

A. THE UNITED STATES HAS REPEATEDLY STATED THAT ITS OBJECTIONS TO EVENTS IN ANGOLA WERE NOT RELATED TO THE MPLA AS AN AFRICAN ORGANIZATION, BUT TO THE MASSIVE INTRODUCTION OF OUTSIDE FORCES SEEKING TO IMPOSE ONE GROUP OVER THE OTHER. THE US REMAINS CONCERNED ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF MASSIVE NUMBERS OF CUBAN FORCES AND SOVIET TECHNICIANS, IN MUCH SMALLER NUMBERS, IN ANGOLA. WE

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WILL WATCH EVENTS INCLUDING THE ACTIONS OF OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES THAT ARE MOST IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED, AND WE WILL TAKE OUR DECISIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE ACTIONS OF THE AUTHORITIES IN ANGOLA AND OF THE VIEWS OF OTHER COUNTRIES WITH WHICH WE HAVE BEEN CLOSELY ASSOCIATED.

Q. IN EUROPE THEY CALL YOU A NEW FOSTER DULLES. THEY ALSO SAY THAT YOU ARE TRYING TO REVIVE IN THE WORLD THE POLICY OF

THE "BIG STICK" I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER YOU AGREE OR NOT WITH THIS AND WHETHER YOU GIVE ME THE REASONS FOR YOUR ANSWER.

A. I'M BEING VARIOUSLY CRITICIZED FOR BEING TOO HARD ON THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND BEING TOO SOFT ON THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. THERE ARE THOSE IN AMERICA WHO CLAIM THAT WE ARE BEING TOO CONCILLIATORY TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THERE ARE THOSE IN AMERICA AND IN EUROPE WHO SAY WE ARE NOT CONCILLIATORY ENOUGH. OUR PROBLEM IS WE ARE LIVING IN A WORLD WHICH IS QUITE NOVEL FOR MANY AMERICANS, IN THAT WE NOW HAVE TO HAVE A PERMANENT ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. AND THAT ALSO, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OUR HISTORY, WE HAVE TO DEAL WITH A COUNTRY OF ROUGHLY EQUAL STRENGTH IN THE SOVIET UNION, SO THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN AMERICAN HISTORY, WE HAVE TO CONDUCT DIPLOMACY OF A PERMANENT BALANCING, CONTINUOUS CHARACTER. THIS CREATES CERTAIN PSYCHOLOGICAL RESENTMENTS AGAINST THE WORLD SO DIFFERENT FROM OUR HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE.

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AND IT IS, THEREFORE, NO SURPRISE THAT THOSE WHO WERE VERY COMFORTABLE WITH THE COLD WAR, AND WHO HAD BECOME VERY FAMILIAR WITH RIGID DIVISIONS AND RHETORICAL DECLARATIONS, THAT THEY SHOULD BE UNCOMFORTABLE. AND IT IS ALSO NOT SURPRISING THAT THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT, SIMPLY, DECLARATIONS

FOR PEACE, UNRELATED TO ANY CONCEPT OF EQUILIBRIUM, CAN ADVANCE MATTERS, TOO SHOULD BE UNCOMFORTABLE. THOSE CRITICS IN EUROPE TO WHOM YOU REFER ARE GENERALLY THOSE WHO WANT TO US TO SUPPORT THE ENTRY INTO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THEIR COUNTRIES, OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY. NOW I THINK THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NEVER VOLUNTEERED AN OPINION ON THAT SUBJECT, BUT WHEN WE ARE ASKED OUR OPINION ON WHETHER WE BELIEVE THAT THE PARTICIPATIONS OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS IN EUROPE WILL NOT HAVE CONSIDERABLE EFFECT, WE ARE BOUND TO STATE THE TRUTH. AND THE TRUTH IS THAT THE PARTICIPATION OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WILL BRING ABOUT A NEW SITUATION, WHETHER OR NOT THESE COMMUNIST PARTIES CLAIM TO BE, OR ARE IN FACT, SOMEWHAT INDEPENDENT OF MOSCOW; BECAUSE I CAN THINK OF MANY GOVERNMENTS THAT ARE INDEPENDENT OF MOSCOW, THAT NEVERTHELESS, PURSUE POLICIES QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE MORAL AND POLITICAL COMMUNITY THAT NOW, TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT, EXISTS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC. UP TO NOW IT HAS NEVER BEEN AN INITIATIVE

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BY THE US. WE STATE THAT SUCH AN EVENT WILL CHANGE THE CHARACTER OF THE RELATIONSHIP NOT BECAUSE WE WISH IT, BUT BECAUSE THIS IS A FACT. BUT BEYOND THIS PARTICULAR QUESTION WHICH YOU RAISE, IT IS A FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION OF HOW WE CAN BRING ABOUT A NEW APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE FACE OF THE TRADITIONAL POLARIZATION BETWEEN TWO GROUPS: ONE THAT BELIEVES THAT ALL YOU NEED TO END THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNISM IS TO STRIKE A RHETORICAL, BELLICOSE STAND; ANOTHER GROUP WHO BELIEVES THAT ALL YOU NEED TO BRING ABOUT PEACE IS TO STRIKE A RHETORICAL PACIFIC STANCE. AND THIS IS THE NATURE OF OUR DEBATE.

Q. LENILDO TABOSA PESSOA, O EXPRESSO: MY QUESTION, TO SOME EXTENT, REPEATS THAT MY COLLEAGUE CARLOS CONDE OF THE ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, BUT I WILL ASK ANYWAY, BECAUSE I WOULD LIKE TO OBTAIN A MORE EXPLICIT ANSWER IF POSSIBLE. YOU STATED THURSDAY, ON THE QUESTION OF THE SOVIET-CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA, THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD DECIDED, AS A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE, TO RESIST SUCH DANGEROUS AND IRRESPONSIBLE ACTIONS. SHOULD IT BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL RESIST THE NEXT SOVIET-CUBAN INTERVENTION IN AFRICA MILITARILY, OR THAT THE US WILL VEHEMENTLY PROTEST WITH WORDS ONLY, AND WILL CALL A NEW HELSINKI CONFERENCE AIMING AT SANCTIFYING THE INVIOABILITY OF THE BORDERS ESTABLISHED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA IN AFRICA?

A. OF COURSE, I JUST WANT THE QUESTIONER TO KNOW THAT I UNDERSTOOD THE SARCASM OF THE QUESTION. BUT, FIRST OF ALL I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE HELSINKI DECLARATION DEALT EXCLUSIVELY WITH EUROPE. SECONDLY, AND BEFORE I GET TO THE SPECIFIC QUESTION, THE UNITED STATES HAS PURSUED A TWO-PRONGED

POLICY. IT HAS ATTEMPTED TO MODERATE POTENTIALLY AGGRESSIVE
CONDUCT, BY ESTABLISHING CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL CODES OR
PRICIPLES TO WHICH NATIONS SHOULD ADHERE. BUT WE HAVE NEVER
HAD ANY ILLUSIONS THAT SIMPLE DECLARATIONS OF OBJECTIVES CAN BE
A SUBSTITUTE FOR GEOPOLITICAL INEQUALITIES. AND THEREFORE.
SIDE BY SIDE WITH ATTEMPTING TO BRING ABOUT A MORE CONCILLIATORY
WORLD, WE HAVE DONE OUR UTMOST TO MAKE SURE THAT THE WORLD IN
WHICH WE LIVE, WHICH IS NOT FULLY CONCILLIATORY, DOES NOT PROVIDE
TEMPTATIONS FOR AGGRESSION. AND AGAIN I WOULD LIKE TO CALL YOUR
ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT IF YOU LOOK AT THE NATURE OF OUR
DEBATE IN AMERICA YOU WILL FIND THAT THE CONCERNS ARE EXPRESSED
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ON BOTH OF THESE POINTS. ON BOTH THE POINT OF ATTEMPTING TO
RESIST, AND ON THE POINT OF TRYING TO CREATE A NEW ENVIRONMENT.
WE DO BELIEVE THAT WE CANNOT STAND FOR EXPANSIONISM. BUT WE ALSO
BELIEVE THAT A CONSTANT ATTEMP TO BALANCE FORCES WILL SOONER OR
LATER LEAD TO A CONFRONTATION AND, THEREFORE, WE WANT TO MOVE
TO A NEW SET OF ARRANGEMENTS.

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AND HELSINKI SHOULD BE SEEN IN THAT CONTEXT, WITHOUT ILLUSION. NOW, WITH RESPECT TO YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTION. I THINK YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR A SECRETARY OF STATE TO DESCRIBE EXACTLY WHAT WE WOULD DO IN CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HAVE NOT YET ARISEN, THAT CANNOT BE FORETOLD. BUT IT WOULD BE OUR DETERMINATION TO DO WHAT IS EFFECTIVE, AND NOT TO HAVE A POST-MORTEM ON A FAILURE, BUT TO DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT THE SUCCESS OF ANOTHER SIMILAR EFFORT.

Q. MARTINS FROM VISAO MAGAZINE: IN THE TEXT OF YOUR SPEECH WHICH THE AMERICAN EMBASSY HAS DISTRIBUTED, IT WAS SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD SIGN THE INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT. IN YOUR SPEECH AT THE DINNER AT ITAMARATY YOU OMITTED THIS POINT. WHY?

A. THE AMERICAN PRESS THAT IS TRAVELLING WITH ME WILL TELL YOU THAT IN ALMOST EVERY SPEECH I SOMETIMES OMIT A PARAGRAPH OR TWO IN ORDER TO SHORTEN THE DELIVERY. IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, IN ORDER TO BE PERFECTLY FRANK, WHILE I WANTED TO CONVEY TO THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT THAT WE WILL SIGN THIS AGREEMENT, I THOUGHT PERHAPS IT WAS NOT SPECIALLY DELICATE AT SUCH A MEETING TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP DEPENDED ON COFFEE, AND AS IF THE POLICY OF THIS COUNTRY EXHAUSTED

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ITSELF IN THE SALE OF ONE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY. AND, THEREFORE, WHILE WE WILL SIGN THE AGREEMENT, WHILE THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE THIS DECISION, AND WHILE THE PRINTED TEXT OF MY SPEECH IS THE OFFICIAL EXPRESSION OF AMERICAN POLICY AND WILL BE CARRIED OUT, I THOUGHT IT WAS PERHAPS SOMEWHAT MORE POLITIC NOT TO READ THAT PARAGRAPH AS IF SOMETHING WHICH WE CONSIDER OF WIDER IMPORTANCE COULD BE SUMMED UP IN A TRADITIONAL EXPORT OF BRAZIL. BUT IN ANY CASE, WHAT WE HAVE-- WHAT IS IN THE TEXT IS OUR POLICY, AND THE PRESIDENT HAS ALREADY. I BELIEVE, TRANSMITTED HIS INTENTIONS OF SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT-- OR WILL VERY SOON--TO THE CONGRESS.

A. ARY RIBEIRO, FROM O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO:
MR. SECRETARY, COULD YOU EXPLAIN WHY YOU DID NOT INFORM YOUR GOOD FRIEND MINISTER AZEREDO DA SILVEIRA BEFORE NOVEMBER 10 ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF CUBAN SOLDIERS IN ANGOLA? ISN'T THIS EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION A USUAL PRACTICE IN THE RELATIONS AMONG FRIENDS?

A. FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA AND I ARE ENGAGING IN A VERY ACTIVE CORRESPONDENCE, AND WE MAKE AN EFFORT, I THINK ON THE WHOLE SUCCESSFUL, OF INFORMING EACH OTHER OF MAJOR EVENTS. WE DO NOT NECESSARILY ASK FOR BRAZILIAN SUPORT ON EVERYTHING THAT WE DO. WITH RESPECT TO THE CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA, THE FULL EXTENT OF IT DID NOT BECOME APPARENT TO US UNTIL THE SECOND HALF OF OCTOBER. WE WERE AWARE OF SOME HUNDREDS OF CUBANS--CUBAN

ADVISORS--EARLIER, BUT AT THAT TIME WE THOUGHT THAT IT WAS STILL WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF AN ESSENTIALLY AFRICAN STRUGGLE. THAT IS TO SAY, WHERE VARIOUS AFRICAN FACTIONS MIGHT ASK FOR OUTSIDE SUPPORT THAT MIGHT BE SIGNIFICANT, BUT NOT SO IMPORTANT AS TO DILUTE THE ESSENTIALLY AMERICAN NATURE OF THE CONFLICT. IT WAS ONLY TOWARDS THE END OF OCTOBER THAT, PUTTING TOGETHER VARIOUS PIECES OF INTELLIGENCE, IT BECAME CLEAR TO US THAT WE WERE NOT DEALING WITH ADVISORS, BUT WITH AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. AND WE THEN, GIVEN THE FACT THAT BUREAUCRACIES DO NOT MOVE WITH ENORMOUS RAPIDITY, WE THEN INFORMED SOME OF OUR CLOSER FRIENDS OF THAT FACT. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT THE CUBAN INTERVENTION ACCELERATED VERY RAPIDLY. AS LATE AS THE MIDDLE OF DECEMBER THERE WERE ONLY ABOUT FOUR TO FIVE THOUSAND CUBANS. I'M TALKING ABOUT DECEMBER NOW, THE MIDDLE OF DECEMBER. THERE WERE ONLY ABOUT FOUR OF FIVE THOUSAND CUBANS IN ANGOLA. TODAY THERE ARE ELEVEN TO TWELVE THOUSAND, SO THAT A MORE THAN DOUBLING OF THE CUBAN UNCLASSIFIED

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FORCE TOOK PLACE AFTER THE MIDDLE OF DECEMBER IN ANGOLA. SO THAT THE FULL CHARACTER OF THE STRUGGLE, THAT IS TO SAY THE FACT THAT WE WERE NO LONGER DEALING WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES HELPING THEIR FRIENDS, BUT WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES IMPOSING THEIR FRIENDS ON THE REST OF THE COUNTRY, WAS NOT REALLY FULLY CLEAR TO US UNTIL JUST BEFORE WE INFORMED THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER.

Q. LAURA MONTEIRO DA FONSECA, ESTADO DE SAO PAULO.

MR. SECRETARY: YOU HAVE SINGLED OUT BRAZIL AS THE MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRY IN LATIN AMERICAN AND ON THE VERGE OF BECOMING A WORLD POWER. HOW ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS? AREN'T YOU CONCERNED WITH THE MATTER?

A. IT IS NOT MY OBLIGATION HERE PUBLICLY TO DISCUSS BRAZILIAN DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS, BUT I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY YESTERDAY IN MY CONVERSATIONS TO LEARN FROM VARIOUS BRAZILIAN OFFICIALS THEIR IDEAS ABOUT THE EVOLUTION OF THIS COUNTRY IN POLITICAL FIELD AND THEIR PERCEPTION OF THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THIS RESPECT.

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Q. SIDNEY BASILIO; GAZETA MERCANTIL-THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT BRAZIL'S TRADE BALANCE CANNOT STAND, WITHOUT GREAT TRAUMA FOR THE COUNTRY, A GENERAL TRADE DEFICIT--PARTICULARLY WITH THE U.S.--SIMILAR TO THAT OF LAST YEAR. IN VIEW OF THIS, AND OF THE MULTIPLICITY OF FORCES WHICH DECIDE WHETHER U.S. TRADE POLICY SHOULD BE MORE OR LESS PROTECTIONIST, MORE OR LESS LIBERAL, WE ASK: WHEN CAN WE EXPECT THAT THE COOPERATION BETWEEN BRAZIL AND U.S. WHICH WAS RESTATED TODAY WILL BECOME MORE OPERATIVE IN TERMS OF COMMERCIAL EFFECTES? IS THER MONEY INVOLVED IN IT? DURING THIS WEEKEND THE U.S. HAS ADOPTED THE POLICY OF BALANCING ITS TRADE RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL, WHICH HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY NEGATIVE FOR OUR COUNTRY. THE U.S. INVITES BRAZIL TO JOIN SLOWLY THE CLUB OF THE POWERFUL. THE INVITATION IS ALSO GOOD FOR THE CLUB OF THE RICH?

A. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT WHEN THE ECONOMY OF A COUNTRY DEVELOPS AT THE RATE AND AT THE SCALE OF THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY, THAT THERE WILL BE OCCASIONAL UNEVENNESS. THER IS ALSO NO QUESTION THAT FROM TIME TO THIS WILL CONFLICT WITH ESTABLISHED PATTERNS IN THE UNITED STATES. IT WOULD BE INSULTING TO YOU TO PRETEND OTHERWISE. THE PROBLEM IS NOT THAT THERE WILL NOT BE MISUNDERSTANDINGS, DISAGREEMENTS, AND OCCASIONALLY EVEN CONFLICTS. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THERE EXISTS THE POLITICAL UNCLASSIFIED

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WILL TO REMOVE THOSE. WITH RESPECT TO THE VERY LAST PART OF YOUR QUESTION, I BELIEVE THAT IT IS BRAZIL'S DESTINY, QUITE FRANKLY NO MATTER WHAT THE UNITED STATES DOES, TO JOIN THE CLUB OF THE RICH. THIS MAY BE PAINFUL TO SOME THEORETICIANS, BUT IT IS IN MY PERSONAL JUDGMENT, UNAVOIDABLE, AND TO BE DESIRED. BUT IN THE INTERVAL, UNTIL THIS OCCURS, A GREAT DEAL DEPENDS ON THE WISDOM OF THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. NOW, AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE CERTAIN LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS THAT ARE MORE OR LESS

AUTOMATICALLY TRIGGERED IN THE CASE OF PARTICULAR EVENTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES. WE HAD EXTENSIVE TALKS ABOUT THE ISSUE THAT YOU RAISED- THE ISSUE OF THE TRADE BALANCE-WHICH IN PART IS ALSO A TEMPORARY PHENOMENON UNTIL ADJUSTMENTS CAN BE MADE IN THE BRAZILIAN SUPPLIES OF RAW MATERIALS. BUT NEVERTHELESS, IT IS REAL ENOUGH. WE HAD EXTENSIVE TALKS, THE BRAZILIAN SIDE, IF I MAY SAY SO, WAS EXTRAORDINARILY WELL PREPARED, AND WE APPROACHED IT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW, NOT OF BEING ABLE TO ELIMINATE THAT IMBALANCE IMMEDIATELY, BUT OF REDUCING IT, AND OF PREVENTING SOME AMERICAN ACTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN SOMETIMES HARMFUL, BUT EVEN MORE FREQUENTLY MORE IRRITATING THAN THEY WERE HARMFUL. THE BRAZILIAN SIDE CAME UP WITH A NUMBER OF GENERAL IDEAS THAT WE THINK ARE EXTREMELY HELPFUL AND THAT WE WANT TO STUDY IN THE UNITED STATES. AND THAT, IF NOT THOSE IDEAS, THEN SOME OTHER IDEAS THAT WILL IN MY JUDGMENT LEAD TO A SOLUTION--HOPEFULLY LEAD TO A SOLUTION--OF SOME OF THE MOST IRRITATING PROBLEMS THAT HAVE EXISTED. WE ARE DETERMINED IN ANY EVENT TO HAVE OUR DECISIONS IN THOSE MATTERS GUIDED BY THE OVERALL PRINCIPLES THAT WE HAVE ENUNCIATED HERE, AND WE WILL BEGIN IMMEDIATELY AN EXAMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES OF THESE PARTICULAR ISSUES. WHEN YOUR MINISTERS COME TO WASHINGTON, AND WHEN OUR SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY COMES HERE, WE HOPE THAT SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE. FROM MY POINT OF VIEW I THINK WE HAD VERY USEFUL TALKS WITH YOUR ECONOMIC MINISTERS YESTERDAY AFTERNOON THAT WERE CONDUCTED IN A REALLY CONSTRUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE ON BOTH SIDES.

Q. MR. MACLEAN OF THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE:

ONE OF THE MOST IRRITATING POINTS IN ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES RECENTLY HAS BEEN THE UNITED STATES SURCHARGE ON IMPORTS OF SHOES. AND ONE OF THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO YOU TO GET RID OF THIS AND TO CIRCUMVENT THE TRADE ACT

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LEGISLATION IS TO GO TO GENEVA AND TO NEGOTIATE. ALTHOUGH THIS WOULDN'T HAVE GREAT ECONOMIC IMPACT, IT WOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE SYMBOLIC IMPACT IN IMPROVING U.S.- BRAZILIAN RELATIONS. DO YOU INTEND TO DO THAT?

A. YOU KNOW THE PROBLEM OF COUNTERVALUING DUTIES IN TRIGGERED ACCORDING TO OUR LAW BY THE COMPLAINTS OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR, AND IS NOT AN ACTION THAT IS USUALLY ORIGINATED, IN FACT IT IS NEVER ORIGINATED BY THE GOVERNMENT. WE ARE CONCERNED HERE WITH A SPECIFIC PROVISION OF THE AMERICAN LAW. BUT WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH BRAZIL THE GENERAL QUESTION OF THE NATURE OF SUBSIDIES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO COUNTERVALUING DUTIES. WE ARE AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF THIS PROCESS OF DISCUSSION AND OUR ECONOMIC AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON MUST OBVIOUSLY HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY IT AN TO PARTICIPATE IN THOSE DISCUSSIONS. SO ALL I WILL SAY IS THAT

WE DISCUSS VARIOUS APPROACHES TO THIS ISSUE THAT MAY OFFER SOME
HOPE THAT THIS PARTICULAR IRRITATION CAN BE EASED IF NOT ELIMINATED

Q. MR. LONG, ASSOCIATED PRESS: WHAT DO YOU THINK ARE THE IMPLICATIONS
AND WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL BE THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE CONGRESS'
DECISION TO CUT OFF MILITARY AID DO CHILE?

A. I THINK YOU CAN APPRECIATE THAT I AM CONDUCTING EXTENSIVE
ENOUGH PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CONGRESS IN THE UNITED STATES
NOT TO FEEL THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY TO CONDUCT THEM ALSO IN
BRASILIA. MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT, SO FAR THIS HAS BEEN ONLY
A VOTE OF THE SENATE, AND HAS NOT BEEN A CONGRESSIONAL ACTION,
I WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY WHEN I RETURN TO HAVE FURTHER
DISCUSSIONS WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS, SO I WILL RESERVE
JUDGMENT UNTIL I HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLORE IT.

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Q. AMERICAN REPORTER: LARS ERIK NELSON
IN YOUR DEALINGS WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF LATIN AMERICA, AND YOUR
ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH A NEW REALTIONSHIP WITH THEM, YOU WILL
INEVITABLY BE DEALING WITH A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTS THAT ARE
SUBJECT TO ACCUSATIONS THAT THEY DO VIOLATE HUMAN RIGHTS.
WITHOUT REGARD TO THE SPECIFICS OF THE HOST COUNTRY, DO YOU PLAN
ANY INITIATIVE TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE PEOPLES OF THESE COUNTRIES
THAT HAVE SUCH GRIEVANCES THAT THEIR RIGHTS ARE BEING VIOLATED,

THAT THE UNITED STATES SYMPATHIZES WITH THEIR ASPIRATIONS?

A. WE HAVE STATED OUR VIEWS ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE REPEATEDLY AND I HAVE ANSWERED A QUESTION ON THAT BEFORE. THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE DIGNITY AND RESPECT OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES, AND ALL GOVERNMENTS UNDERSTAND OUR VIEWS IN THIS.

Q. AMERICAN REPORTER: (UNIDENTIFIED)

MR. SECRETARY, IF YOU'LL TAKE A NON-LATIN AMERICAN QUESTION. FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON HAS JUST FLOWN TO CHINA. COULD YOU GIVE US YOUR APPRAISAL OF WHAT HIS TRIP MAY MEAN FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS. SPECIFICALLY, IS THERE ANY POSSIBILITY THAT IF PRESIDENT NIXON SEES THE NEW PRIME MINISTER OF CHINA HE WILL DISCUSS WITH HIM HIS IMPRESSIONS OF HIS VISIT.

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A. I HAVE BEEN ASKED THIS QUESTION REPEATEDLY IN THE UNITED STATES. WE WERE NOT CONSULTED ABOUT THE TRIP AHEAD OF TIME, AND WE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT THE TRIP UNTIL IT WAS ANNOUNCED, SO IT DID NOT REPRESENT AN ACTION BY THE UNITED STATES. IF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF CHINA HAS INVITED FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON, WHO HAS THE HISTORIC MERIT OF INITIATING THAT RELATIONSHIP, IF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF CHINA INVITED HIM IN ORDER TO UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE THAT THEY ATTACH TO THAT RELATIONSHIP, WE ARE IN FAVOR OF ANY ACT THAT STRESSES THE SIGNIFICANCE EITHER SIDE ATTACHES TO THE RELATIONSHIP, EVEN IF WE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT THE PARTICULAR METHOD THAT WAS CHOSEN. AS FAR AS TALKING TO PRESIDENT NIXON AFTER HE RETURNS, WE WILL OF COURSE WISH TO LEARN ABOUT THE NATURE OF HIS DISCUSSIONS AND ABOUT HIS IMPRESSIONS. THE PARTICULAR METHOD THAT WILL BE USED TO LEARN OF THESE VIEWS WE WILL DECIDE AFTER THE FORMER PRESIDENT HAS RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES.

Q. MR. O'LEARY: WASHINGTON STAR: (GARBLE) HAVE NOW ALL AGREED TO CONSULT IN ADVANCE ON ALL MATTERS OF GLOBAL POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE IN THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION. ONE OF THE HIGHEST PREOCCUPATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES IS CUBAN MILITARY ADVENTURES OVERSEAS. IS IT LOGICAL TO ASSUME THEREFORE THAT WHEN THESE DISCUSSIONS OR CONSULTATIONS OCCUR, YOU WILL REAFFIRM BRAZIL'S SUPPORT FOR YOUR POSITION ABOUT CUBA?

I WANT TO STRESS, IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS, THAT MY VISIT TO THIS HEMISPHERE IS NOT TO ENLIST SUPPORT AGAINST CUBA. THE VISIT TO THIS HEMISPHERE HAS BEEN PLANNED FOR A LONG TIME. THE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THIS CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENT GOES BACK TWO YEARS. THEY WERE STARTED DURING A PERIOD WHEN THE UNITED STATES WAS MOVING TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH CUBA AND HAD REPEATEDLY INDICATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH CUBA. AND I DO NOT WANT TO TURN OUR WESTERN

HEMISPHERE POLICY OR OUR BRAZILIAN POLICY INTO AN OBSESSION WITH
A SMALL CARRIBEAN COUNTRY. IF THERE ARE SPECIFIC CAUSES FOR
CONCERN ABOUT CUBA AND IF THE UNITED STATES FEELS THAT ACTION IS
CALLED FOR, WE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH OTHER
INTERESTED LATIN AMERICAN STATES. AND , OF COURSE, WE WILL
DISCUSS SUCH A MATTER WITH AN OLD FRIEND WHICH SEES THINGS IN
THESE RESPECTS FAIRLY PARALLEL, AS BRAZIL. BUT THIS IS NOT THE
REASON FOR THIS DOCUMENT WE SIGNED. THIS DOCUMENT WAS PREPARED
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BEFORE THERE WAS ANY CONCERN WITH CUBA, AND WE DO NOT NEED IT TO
DEAL WITH CUBA.
CRIMMINS

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